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Abstract In this paper we define a trust-based argumentative reasoning formalism where the source of the
received information is used to decide the warranted conclusions. In the proposed formalism, the agent’s tentative
conclusions are supported by arguments, and these conclusions can in turn be attacked by other arguments,
referred to as counter-arguments. The inference mechanism compares arguments and counter-arguments to decide
which conclusion prevails. We propose a novel development of different argument comparison criteria based on
trust. Thus, given a particular application domain, the more appropriate criterion can be used. Finally, since a
realistic scenario should consider that trust on informants is usually subject to change, a complete change theory
over the agents’ trust is introduced.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we propose a trust-based argumentative formalism for deliberative agents that participate
in a Multi-agent system. We consider that each agent can act as an informant for other agents in the
system, and that agents collaborate by sharing information. Therefore, in our proposal each agent can
obtain information from multiple sources, and the agent’s attribution of trust to a particular informant
can be higher than the trust attributed to others. Hence, when the information provided for different
agents is in conflict, trust can be used in the decision process leading to a prevailing conclusion. Since
in many application domains the agent’s assessment of trust of the agents in the system varies, we have
developed change operators to handle this dynamics.
The importance of trust models have been widely emphasized in the literature. In [12], the authors
mention that two particular elements have contributed to substantially increase the interest on trust in
this area: the multi-agent system paradigm and the spectacular evolution of e-commerce. The results
coming from the study of trust has many applications in Information and Communication Technologies;
e.g., it has been recognized as a key factor for successful electronic commerce adoption. These results
are used by intelligent software agents as a mechanism to search for trustworthy exchange partners, and
also as an important factor in the decision-making process related to whether or not enter into a contract
or even honor them. However, it is clear that trust models are needed in most problems where critical
decisions depend on the perceived value of the information received from other agents. The work that
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we propose here can be applied to multi-agent systems requiring that the trust or credibility assigned to
informants be considered as part of a decision process.
As a simple example, consider an agent that has to decide whether to buy a digital camera; this agent
receives advice from two informant agents I1 and I2. Lets assume also that the agent regards I2 as less
credible than I1; now, I1 informs that “the camera xq is a good option”, and I2 informs that “xq is
not a good option”. Clearly, the conclusion “xq is a good option” should prevail. As time passes, the
agent changes its assessment of the credibility relation of its informants: I1 is now less credible than I2;
therefore the conclusion “xq is not a good option” should prevail.
As we will describe below, in our proposal we will consider logic-based deliberative agents with an
argumentative inference mechanism. Hence, conclusions will be supported by arguments built from
information coming from different sources. As an agent could receive contradictory information from
different informants, conflictive arguments can appear. To solve these conflicts, a decision mechanism
based on trust will be provided.
Consider for instance an scenario where an agent V is visiting a town and an agent IA informs V that
“it was snowing during the night”. Other informant IB tells V that “roads are usually closed when snows
during the night”. Then V tentatively should conclude that “roads are closed”. Another agent IC tells
V that “if temperature is high, roads will not be closed”, and the weather service IW has reported that
“now temperature is high”. From this information, there are also reasons for conclude that “roads are
not closed”; that is, the information obtained from IA and IB allows to conclude that “roads are closed”,
whereas the information obtained from IC and IW allows for the conclusion that “roads are not closed”.
In this scenario, the trust on IA,IB , IC and IW can be used for deciding which conclusion prevails. For
instance, if IC and IW are both more credible than IA and IB , it is clear that the conclusion should be
“roads are not closed”.
As we mentioned, in the formalism proposed here agent’s tentative conclusions will be supported by
arguments; but counter-arguments against these arguments are considered in a dialectical process. When
contradictory information appears, a trust-based argument comparison criterion will be used to decide
the predominant arguments. Recently, some approaches that combine argumentation and trust have been
developed [11, 16, 15]; in general, these formalisms are focused on using argumentation to reason about
trust. Here we will follow a different route, our proposal uses trust assigned to informants in the decision
process leading to the prevailing information in the context of conflictive knowledge.
Trust is a concept that is both complex and rather difficult to define with precision; for that reason,
the literature is not in agreement regarding this elusive notion. In our approach, we consider trust as
representing the credibility attached to information sources. This description is closely related to the
following definitions: Barber and Kim in [2] suggest that trust is the “confidence in the ability and
intention of an information source to deliver correct information”; Gambetta in [4] states that “trust is
the subjective (assessment) by which an individual, A, expects that another individual, B, performs a
given action on which its welfare depends”; and Mcknight and Chervany in [10] propose that “trust is
the extent to which one party is willing to depend on something or somebody in a given situation with
a feeling of relative security, even though negative consequences are possible.”
Next, we present a scenario that will be used as a running example in the rest of the paper. Assume Eve
is considering whether to travel next week. She can obtain information from three different informants:
her boss, her colleague Paul, and her assigned client. Eve knows that: “she can travel if she has no
work to do”, “Paul is ill”, and “if Paul is ill he cannot replace her at work”. Her boss has informed her
that: “if she has work to do, then she cannot travel”, and “he thinks that she has some work to do”.
After checking with her assigned client, Eve knows that “she has no work to do”. With the information
obtained from her boss, Eve can build an argument supporting that “she cannot travel”; also, using
the information received from her client, she can conclude that “she can travel”. Since Eve puts more
trust on her boss than in Paul, and she trusts more her assigned client than her boss, she can use that
trust-based preference to reach a decision on which argument prevails.
The main contribution of this paper is the definition of a trust-based argumentative reasoning for-
malism where the source of the received information is used to decide the warranted conclusions. In
our formalism, the agent’s tentative conclusions are supported by arguments, and these conclusions can
in turn be attacked by other arguments, referred to as counter-arguments. The inference mechanism
compares arguments and counter-arguments to decide which conclusion prevails. Another novel develop-
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ment is the definition of different argument comparison criteria based on trust. Thus, given a particular
application domain, the more appropriate criterion can be used. Finally, since a realistic scenario should
consider that trust on informants is usually subject to change, a revision operator for the credibility order
affecting the informants is introduced.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we introduce how agents represent the trust
assigned to their informants as a credibility order among them, and how agents represent knowledge
and store the received information. Section 3 shows how and agent can build arguments and counter-
arguments using our formalism. Next, Section 4 develops different concrete argument comparison criteria
that are based on trust. In Section 5 we will show how to determine in which literals the agent believes
using the arguments and the relation presented in the previous sections. Section 6 introduces a complete
change theory over the agents’ trust. Finally, in Section 7 conclusions and related work are commented.
2 Knowledge Representation
The main intuitions in our approach call for the consideration of the sources of information in a multi-
agent system, and the realization that, in general, they are not equally credible. That is, the trust that
an agent has in each of its informants can be different and, as importantly, that trust may vary over
time. To reflect these observations, we will start by considering a finite set of agent identifiers I enough
to assign a different identifier to each member of the system. Also, we will assume that an order is defined
over I. For instance, I = {I1, I2, I3} or I = {Ia, Ib, Ic, Id} or I = {A,B,C,D,E, F} are all valid sets of
agent identifiers. To represent a credibility order among the set I, and to have the ability of changing that
order dynamically, the formalism proposed in [14] will be used. For the purpose of clarity, we will recall
the definition of generator set that allows for the representation of a partial order among informants.
Definition 1 (Generator set [14]) Given a finite set of informants I, a generator set over I is a binary
relation on I called G-set, (G-set ⊆ I× I). An informant I1 ∈ I is less credible than an informant I2 ∈ I,
according to G-set, if (I1, I2) ∈ G-set∗, where G-set∗ represents the reflexive transitive closure of G-set.








Figure 1: A graph representation of a generator set.
Graphically, a generator set G-set is represented as a directed graph, where the nodes are labeled
with identifiers in I, and the arcs represent the tuples in G-set, i.e., (I1, I2) ∈ G-set iff there is an arc
from node I1 to node I2. For example, given the set I = {B,C,D,E, F,G,H, I} the digraph in Figure 1
shows the representation of the generator set G-set1 = {(C,D), (C,E), (D,F ), (E,F ), (E,G), (H, I)}.
The relation G-set∗, i.e., the reflexive transitive closure of G-set, is the smallest preorder containing
G-set. Any pair (I1, I2) ∈ G-set∗ is referred to as a credibility tuple, and it represents the relation that
I1 is less credible than I2. For instance, in the generator set G-set1 introduced above, (C,G) ∈ G-set∗1
and (C,F ) ∈ G-set∗1. That is, in this example, C is less credible than D, C is less credible than F , C is
less credible than G, and C and H are not related.
As in [14] we assume that a generator set G-set∗ is a partial order, that is, a generator set must be
sound. Since G-set∗ is the reflexive and transitive closure of G-set, for soundness to fail on G-set∗, it is
necessary that the antisymmetry property fails, i.e., there is at least a couple of pairs (C,D) and (D,C)
in G-set∗. This will mean that both C is less credible than D and that D is less credible than C. For
that reason, to avoid this undesirable situation, we require for the generator set to be a partial order, i.e.,
it must obey reflexivity, antisymmetry and transitivity. For example, the generator set G-set1 showed in
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Figure 1 is sound. Nevertheless, G-set2 = G-set1 ∪ {(F,C)} is not sound because (C,F ) ∈ G-set∗2 and
(F,C) ∈ G-set∗2, violating the antisymmetry condition for partial orders.
Example 1 Consider the scenario presented in the introduction, where: Eve (Ie) is less credible than
her assigned client Ic, Paul Ip is less credible than Eve, Paul is less credible than Eve’s boss (Ib), and
also that Eve’s boss is less credible than Eve’s assigned client. This information can be represented by
I = {Ie, Ip, Ic, Ib} and the generator set: G-setEve ={ (Ip,Ib), (Ib, Ic), (Ie,Ic), (Ip,Ie) }. Figure 2 shows





Figure 2: Graph representation for G-setEve of Example 1.
In the scenario described, agents will receive information from different sources that are not equally
credible, therefore the information, that can be contradictory, will be considered as tentative. Therefore,
there is a need for a formalism capable of deciding what to believe by performing reasoning in the presence
of tentative and contradictory information; the reasoning mechanism will consider the trust of report-
ing agents to decide among contradictory conclusions. In our approach, knowledge representation and
reasoning will be based on Defeasible Logic Programming (DeLP). Our interest in this particular com-
putational tool is that its language provides the declarative capability of representing weak information
in the form of defeasible rules and presumptions, and its defeasible argumentation inference mechanism
allows warranting conclusions in the presence of contradictory information. Below, we will summarily
introduce the elements in DeLP and we will refer the reader to [5] for a full account of Defeasible Logic
Programming and to [3] to experiment with the fully implemented system. DeLP is an extension of
Logic Programming, and for that reason we will freely use its language and terminology (see [9] for more
details).
Defeasible rules are used to represent tentative information that may be used when nothing could
be posed against it. They are denoted as an ordered pair “L0 —< {L1, . . . , Ln}” where L0 is a ground
literal called the “Head” of the rule, and {L1, . . . , Ln} is a set of ground literals called the “Body” of
the rule. The symbols “{” and “}” on the body of a rule will be omitted when no confusion could arise.
Presumption are a special type of defeasible rules with an empty body, denoted “L0 —< ”. Following
the terminology of Logic Programming, literals represent atomic information or the negation of atomic
information using strong negation. In DeLP, the symbol “∼” is used for representing strong negation. A
ground literal is a literal that has no variables. Two ground literals disagree if they are complementary
with respect to strong negation (e.g., ∼L and L).
A defeasible rule “Head —< Body” expresses that “reasons to believe in the antecedent Body give
reasons to believe in the consequent Head.” For instance, the defeasible rule “road closed —< snowing”
represents that “reasons to believe that is snowing provides reasons to believe that roads are closed”,
whereas “∼road closed —< snowplows” represents that “reasons to believe that snowplows are working
provides reasons to believe that roads are not closed.” The rule “snowplows —< ” represents the presump-
tion that snowplows are working.
In our approach, agents will incorporate the received information in the form of defeasible information
objects. A defeasible information object will associate a defeasible rule (or presumption) with an informant
agent.
Definition 2 (Defeasible information object) Let I be the set of informants. A defeasible informa-
tion object is a tuple (I, R), where I ∈ I and R is a defeasible rule.
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Definition 3 (Informant-based DeLP program) An informant-based DeLP program (or ibdp for
short) is a finite set of defeasible information objects denoted as ∆+.
Example 2 Consider the set of identifiers of Example 1: I ={Ie,Ip,Ic,Ib } where Ie is Eve, Ip is her
colleague Paul, Ib Eve’s boss, and Ic is Eve’s assigned client. Consider the literals t, w, r, i, p and i with
the following informal interpretations.
t : travel
w : work to do
r : Paul can replace Eve
i : Paul is ill
p : Paul has work to do
Then, the following information-based DeLP program represents Eve’s knowledge:
∆+Eve =
 (Ib, w
—< ), (Ip, r —< ∼p), (Ic, ∼w —< ), (Ie, t —< ∼w),
(Ib, ∼t —< w), (Ip, t —< r), (Ie, ∼r —< i),
(Ib, ∼r —< i), (Ip, ∼p —< ), (Ie, i —< )

Note that ∆+Eve has ten defeasible information objects that have been arranged in columns just for
reader’s convenience. The first column contains the information obtained from Eve’s boss: the object
“(Ib, w —< )” represents that “according to her boss Eve has work to do”; the object “(Ib, ∼t —< w)”
states that “according to her boss if she has work to do, then she can not travel”; whereas the object
(Ib, ∼r —< i) represents that “her boss has informed her that if Paul is ill then he can not replace her”.
The second column contains the information obtained from Paul: “if he has no work to do then he
may replace her”, “if he replaces her then she may travel”, and “Paul has no work to do”. The third
column shows the information received from Eve’s client: “there is no work to do”. The last column has
information that Eve has from herself.
Note that in a ibdp there can be two or more informant objects that have the same defeasible
rule R but a different informant (e.g., (Ie, ∼r —< i) and (Ib, ∼r —< i)); this does not mean that there
is redundancy in the agent knowledge base, since it represents that the same piece of knowledge was
received from different sources. This feature can be considered as an advantage of our representation
since the credibility order is dynamic, at any moment the more credible informant of R can be consider.
Note also that the ibdp of an agent A can contain information objects with the agent identifier A.
In our approach, each agent will integrate four elements: its own agent identifier, an informant-based
DeLP program used to store its knowledge, a generator set that represents the credibility order among
informants, and a trust-based argument comparison criterion that will be used in the warranting process
for deciding which information prevails when arguments for and against a conclusion exist. The first three
elements have been introduced above, the trust-based argument comparison criterion will be introduced
in Section 4. The definition of agent is included next.
Definition 4 (Agent) Let I be a finite set of agent identifiers. An agent is a tuple (I,∆+, G-set,)
where I ∈ I, ∆+ is an informant-based DeLP program, G-set is a generator set over I, and “ ” is a
trust-based argument comparison criterion.
As we will show below, two different agents (I1,∆+, G-set1,) and (I2,∆+, G-set2,) could have
the same ibdp and the same comparison criterion but different generator set, and for that reason their
inferred conclusions could be different. Similarly, two agents (I3,∆+, G-set,3) and (I4,∆+, G-set,4)
could have the same ibdp and the same generator set but a different comparison criterion and their
conclusions could also differ. Also note that since agent identifiers are unique, having the agent identifier
as a component allows to have two different agents (I5,∆+, G-set,) and (I6,∆+, G-set,) that have
the same ibdp, the same generator set and the same comparison criterion. In this last case, they will
obtain the same conclusions.
Example 3 Consider the scenario presented in the introduction, the agent Eve can be represented as
(Ie,∆+Eve, G-setEve,) where G-setEve is the generator set of Example 1 and the ibdp ∆+Eve of Ex-
ample 2.
18 Inteligencia Artificial 49(2012)
In the following sections a trust-based argumentative reasoning formalism will be introduced. Using
this formalism, the knowledge base ∆+ the agent (I,∆+, G-set,) will use for warranting its derived
beliefs contains its own information and the information objects received from other agents. A belief
B will be warranted if a non-defeated argument for B exists. Intuitively, the trust-based argument
comparison criterion  will be used to decide when an argument is preferred to other contradicting
argument. Hence, warranted beliefs depend on the credibility order G-set.
In Section 6, we will introduce the change operators of expansion, contraction and revision. The agent
I can use these operator for changing the order in its G-set, reflecting the dynamics in the credibility
assigned to its informants. Since warrant relies on the credibility attached to informants, a change in
G-set could mean that previously warranted belief are no longer warranted, and new beliefs can become
warranted. This process will reflect the dynamics of the belief base of an agent.
3 Arguments and counter-arguments
A central piece of this formalism that will allow the agent to handle contradictory information is the
notion of argument; arguments will be built as support for the tentative beliefs of the agent. Intuitively,
a concrete argument is a structure where a claim is supported from a set premises through the use of
a reasoning mechanism; in here, the claims of the arguments will be the tentative beliefs of the agent.
When considering the argument support for a particular (tentative) belief, the agent can find arguments,
referred to as counterarguments, that are in conflict with it because they support contradictory claims or
the claim supported by one contradicts some part of the structure the other, i.e., opposes the reasoning
used or is against the premises of the original argument. In this situation, it is necessary to have a way
of comparing the arguments in conflict to decide which one is “better”. The analysis of the situation
follows a dialectical process seeking to validate the arguments in conflict. The arguments that survive all
possible attack by counterarguments are said to warrant their conclusion or claim.
In this section we will show how an agent (I,∆+, G-set,) can build arguments using the defeasible
information objects stored in its informant-based DeLP program ∆+, we will discuss the comparison of
arguments in Section 4, and the dialectical process will be described in Section 5.
As a preliminary notion before introducing argument we need to define defeasible derivation.
Definition 5 (Defeasible Derivation) Let ∆+ be a ibdp and L a ground literal. A defeasible deriva-
tion of L from ∆+, denoted ∆+|∼L, consists of a finite sequence L1, L2, . . . , Ln = L of ground literals,
where each literal Li (1 ≤ n) is in the sequence because:
(a) there exists a defeasible information object (I, Li —< ) in ∆+, or
(b) there exists a defeasible information object (I, R) in ∆+, such that R has head Li and body
B1, B2, . . . , Bk and every literal of the body is an element Lj of the sequence appearing before Li
(j < i.)
A derivation for a literal L is called “defeasible” because as we will show next, there may exist
information in contradiction with L, or any of the literals appearing in the sequence, and in certain
conditions this could prevent the acceptance of L as a warranted belief. Note that rules from different
informants can be combined together to derive a literal; the source of the information is not relevant
for the derivation, however, as we will show when we develop our preference criterion in the following
section, the source of the information will be used to appraise the strength of the conclusion’s support.
It is important to observe that from the same ibdp there could be several, distinct, defeasible derivations
for a given literal. The following example shows how, from a given ibdp, it is possible to obtain defeasible
derivations for contradictory literals.
Example 4 Consider the ibdp ∆+Eve of example 2. From that program there exist two defeasible deriva-
tions for the literal ‘t’. The sequence ‘∼p, r, t’ is a defeasible derivation for ‘t’, obtained from the defeasible
information objects: (Ip, ∼p —< ), (Ip, r —< ∼p), (Ip, t —< r). The sequence ‘∼w, t’ is another defeasible
derivation for ‘t’, obtained from (Ic, ∼w —< ) and (Ie, t —< ∼w). Note that the first derivation for ‘t’
was built using information from the same source (Ip), whereas the other uses information from different
sources. From the same program ∆+Eve there is also a defeasible derivation for ‘∼t’, that uses the objects
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(Ib, w —< ) and (Ib, ∼t —< w). That is, from a ibdp is possible to have defeasible derivations for con-
tradictory literals. Finally, note that the following literals have also a defeasible derivation from ∆+Eve:
‘w’, ‘∼r’, ‘r’, ‘∼p’, ‘∼w’ and ‘i’.
Definition 6 (Contradictory set of rules) Let ∆+ be an ibdp and A ⊆ ∆+. We say that the set of
information objects A is contradictory if and only if from A is possible to defeasible derive a literal L
and its complement ∼L .
Example 5 Consider the informant-based defeasible program ∆+Eve introduced in example 2. The subset
A1 ⊆ ∆+Eve A1 = {(Ib, w —< ), (Ib, ∼t —< w), (Ip, r —< ∼p), (Ip, t —< r)} is contradictory whereas the
subset A2 ⊆ ∆+Eve A2 = {(Ib, w —< ), (Ib, ∼t —< w)} is not. It is clear that if a set A1 is contradictory,
then any superset of A1 is contradictory.
As we have mentioned, the notion of argument plays a fundamental role in this system. Now, we
will introduce the definition of argument, and the related notion of subargument, both are adapted from
similar definitions given in [13, 5].
Definition 7 (Argument - Subargument) Let L be a literal, and ∆+ an ibdp. We say that A ⊆ ∆+
is an argument for L, denoted 〈A, L〉, if:
1. there exists a defeasible derivation of L from A,
2. the set A is non-contradictory,
3. A is minimal: there is no proper subset A′ of A such that A′ satisfies conditions (1) and (2).
Given two arguments 〈A1, L1〉 and 〈A2, L2〉, we say that 〈A2, L2〉 is a subargument of 〈A1, L1〉 if and
only if A2 ⊆ A1.
The definition above characterizes an argument as a minimal and non-contradictory set of rules that
allows to defeasibly derive a conclusion. Therefore, although an agent could maintain a contradictory
ibdp ∆+, agent’s beliefs will be supported by arguments which are, by definition, non-contradictory.
Example 6 Consider again the ibdp ∆+ Eve of Example 2. Then the agent Ie will be able to build the
following arguments:
〈A1, w〉 = 〈{(Ib, w —< )}, w〉 〈A2,∼t〉 = 〈{(Ib, ∼t —< w), (Ib, w —< )},∼t〉
〈A3,∼r〉 = 〈{(Ib, ∼r —< i), (Ie, i —< )},∼r〉 〈A4, r〉 = 〈{(Ip, r —< ∼p), (Ip, ∼p —< )}, r〉
〈A5, t〉 = 〈{(Ip, t —< r), (Ip, r —< ∼p), (Ip, ∼p —< )}, t〉 〈A6,∼p〉 = 〈{(Ip, ∼p —< )},∼p〉
〈A7,∼w〉 = 〈{(Ic, ∼w —< )},∼w〉 〈A8, t〉 = 〈{(Ie, t —< ∼w), (Ic, ∼w —< )}, t〉
〈A9,∼r〉 = 〈{(Ie, ∼r —< i), (Ie, i —< )},∼r〉 〈A10, i〉 = 〈{(Ie, i —< )}, i〉
Observe that 〈A4, r〉 is a subargument of 〈A5, t〉. Also note that although arguments 〈A3,∼r〉 and 〈A9,∼r〉
share the defeasible rule ∼r —< i, they differ in the informant recorded as part of the information object
in each case: Ib for A3, and Ie for A9. As we develop the system, the importance of maintaining this
information will become clear. The main reason for this is the credibility order among informants may
change and, therefore, the argument A3 for “∼r” may became stronger than the argument A9 for “∼r”
which uses the same defeasible rule but different informants.
From the examples above, it is clear that from an ibdp there can be arguments that are in conflict:
for instance, 〈A3,∼r〉 and 〈A4, r〉 or 〈A3,∼r〉 and 〈A5, t〉. This situation is captured by the notion of
counterargument or attack.
Definition 8 (Attack) Let 〈A1, L1〉 and 〈A2, L2〉 be two arguments. We say that 〈A1, L1〉 counterar-
gues, or attacks 〈A2, L2〉 at literal L, if and only if there exists a subargument 〈A, L〉 of 〈A2, L2〉 such
that L and L1 disagree, i.e., L and L1 are complementary literals regarding “∼”.
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In Example 6 for instance, the argument 〈A3,∼r〉 attacks the argument 〈A5, t〉 because 〈A5, t〉 has
〈A4, r〉 as a subargument and “∼r” disagrees with “r”. Also note that the argument 〈A5, t〉 attacks the
argument 〈A2,∼t〉 since “t” disagrees with “∼t” (an argument is a subargument of itself). Observe that
it also is the case that 〈A2,∼t〉 attacks 〈A5, t〉. Usually attacks to intermediate conclusions (like the one
from 〈A3,∼r〉 to 〈A5, t〉) are known as “inner attacks”, whereas attacks directly to the conclusion are
known as “direct attacks” (like the one from 〈A5, t〉 to 〈A2,∼t〉).
Remark 1 If an argument 〈A1, L1〉 attacks 〈A, L〉 at literal L, then 〈A1, L1〉 also attacks any other
〈A2, L2〉 such that 〈A, L〉 is a subargument of 〈A2, L2〉. Observe also that the attack notion has the
property that every time an argument 〈A1, L1〉 attacks other argument 〈A2, L2〉, then, there always exist
other argument that attacks 〈A1, L1〉, i.e., the corresponding subargument of 〈A2, L2〉 whose conclusion
disagrees with L1.
To establish whether 〈A, L〉 is a non-defeated argument, it is necessary to analyze all of its associated
counterarguments; let B1, B2, . . ., Bk be all the counterarguments of A, each one of them potentially
being a (defeasible) reason for rejecting A. If any Bi is (somehow) “better” than, or unrelated to, A,
then Bi is a candidate for defeating A. However, if the argument A is “better” than the argument Bi,
then Bi will not be taken in consideration as a defeater A. Therefore, to decide on the result of an attack
we need to introduce a preference relation that will settle the question. We will do that next with the
help of the trust relation among agents.
4 Trust-based argument comparison criteria
Until now the dialectical process considers the support of piece of information in form of an argument.
We have progressed to the point we can consider the potential attacks of one argument over other. In this
section we will introduce comparison criteria that will establish if an attack is successful; in that case,
the counterargument involved will be successful becoming a defeater and the argument under attack will
become defeated.
Consider the following arguments from Example 6 as an illustration of a conflictive situation:
〈A2,∼t〉 = 〈{(Ib, ∼t —< w), (Ib, w —< )},∼t〉
〈A5, t〉 = 〈{(Ip, t —< r), (Ip, r —< ∼p), (Ip, ∼p —< )}, t〉
In this case, both arguments are in conflict and they are in a situation of mutual attack. To decide
whether one of them defeats the other, we need a way of comparing them. The following definition
introduces this idea in an abstract manner.
Definition 9 (Argument comparison criterion) Let Args be the set of arguments that can be ob-
tained from a ibdp. An argument comparison criterion is a relation  ⊆ Args× Args, that is irreflexive,
i.e., if A ∈ Args then A  A; and asymmetric, i.e., given A,B ∈ Args when AB it is the case that
B  A.
Notice that the “” relation on Args is not assumed to be transitive.
In this section we will develop three different concrete argument comparison criteria that are based
on informants credibility. However, first we need to introduce a more atomic preference relation among
defeasible information objects. This notion formalizes how trust is used by agents for compare knowledge
that it is explicitly stored in their knowledge bases (∆+) and will be used below by concrete argument
comparison criteria. Note that the following definition captures the idea that information from a more
credible agent should be preferred over the information of a less credible agent.
Definition 10 (Defeasible information object preference) Let G-set∗ be a generator set and let
(I1, R), (I2, K) be two defeasible information objects (dio). We say that (I1, R) is preferred over
(I2, K), noted by (I1, R)>dio(I2, K), if and only if (I2, I1) ∈ G-set∗, i.e., I2 is less credible than I1 .
Example 7 Consider the program ∆+Eve of Example 2 and the generator set G-setEve of Example 1,
G-setEve = {(Ip, Ie), (Ip, Ib),(Ib, Ic), (Ie, Ic)}. In this case, we have that ( Ic , ∼w —< ) is preferred to
( Ip , r —< ∼p) since (Ip,Ic) ∈ G-set∗. Also note that ( Ie , t —< ∼w) is not preferred to ( Ib , ∼t —< w)
(or viceversa) because Ie and Ib are incomparable according to this agent.
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As we will show below, based on the defeasible information object preference (>dio) defined above,
several trust-based argument comparison criteria can be defined. This notion is modular, i.e., the ar-
gument comparison criterion can be replaced without affecting the rest of the formalism; therefore, it is
possible to select the more appropriate criterion for a particular application domain. Observe that the
definition of an agent as (I,∆+, G-set,) contains an argument comparison criterion “ ”, in such a way
that it can be conveniently changed.
The first criterion is based on the credibility attached to the informants and will be called single rule
credibility criterion. This criterion will prefer an argument A over an argument B if there is at least one
defeasible information object in A with an informant that is more credible than an informant in some
defeasible information object in B, and no defeasible information object in B is preferred to some other
in A. This intuition is formalized in the following definition.
Definition 11 (Single rule credibility criterion) Let 〈A, L〉 and 〈B, Q〉 be two arguments built from
an ibdp ∆+. We will say that 〈A, L〉 is s-preferred to 〈B, Q〉, noted 〈A, L〉 S 〈B, Q〉 iff:
- There are (Ii, R) ∈ A and (Ij , W ) ∈ B such that (Ii, R)>dio(Ij , W ), and
- There is no (Ik, V ) ∈ A and (Il, U) ∈ B such that (Il, U)>dio(Ik, V ).
Proposition 1 The relation S is an argument comparison criterion.
Proof:We have to prove that for all A,B ∈ Args:
1. ASA does not hold (irreflexivity).
We will use reductio ad absurdum. Suppose A SA. Then, there are (Ii, R), (Ij , W ) ∈ A such
that (Ii, R)>dio(Ij , W ), which immediately contradicts the second condition of the Definition 11.
2. if AS B then BS A (asymmetry).
Suppose AS B. Then, there are (Ii, R) ∈ A and (Ij , W ) ∈ B such that (Ii, R)>dio(Ij , W ),
and there is no (Ik, V ) ∈ A and (Il, U) ∈ B such that (Il, U)>dio(Ik, V ). Thus, there is no
(Ih, Y ) ∈ B and (Ig, Z) ∈ A such that (Ih, Y )>dio(Ig, Z) violating the first condition of the
Definition 11. Hence, BS A.
Example 8 Consider the agent (Ie,∆+Eve, G-setEve,) of Example 3 and its arguments presented in
Example 6. Consider now that the selected comparison criteria  is S. Note that the argument 〈A8, t〉 =
〈{(Ie, t —< ∼w), (Ic, ∼w —< )}, t〉 is s-preferred to 〈A2,∼t〉 = 〈{(Ib, ∼t —< w), (Ib, w —< )},∼t〉 since the
defeasible information object (Ic, ∼w —< ) from 〈A8, t〉 is preferred to (Ib, w —< ) from 〈A2,∼t〉, and
there is no defeasible information object from 〈A2,∼t〉 preferred to some from 〈A8, t〉.
The single rule criterion is not discriminative enough since, in the general case, will leave many
comparisons of arguments undecided. Next, we will consider the criterion of least credible rules that
takes a more refined approach. To realize the comparison this criterion considers just those defeasible
information objects of each argument with the least credible informant. Previously to the introduction
of this criterion, we will first define which are the least credible defeasible objects in an argument.
Definition 12 (Least credible defeasible information objects) Let 〈A, L〉 an argument of an agent
Ag. The least credible defeasible information objects 〈A, L〉, noted Min(〈A, L〉), is a set such that (I1, R) ∈
Min(〈A, L〉) if and only if (I1, R) ∈ A and there is no (I2, K) ∈ A such that (I1, R)>dio(I2, K).
For instance, the argument 〈A8, t〉 = 〈{(Ie, t —< ∼w), (Ic, ∼w —< )}, t〉 of the agent Ie from Exam-
ple 6 will be such that Min(〈A8, t〉) = {(Ie, t —< ∼w)}. Note that the Min set of an argument can contain
several defeasible information objects. Next we will formalize the intuition introduced above for the least
credibility criterion.
Definition 13 (Least credible rules criterion) Let 〈A1, L1〉 and 〈A2, L2〉 be two arguments of an
ibdp ∆+. We will say that 〈A1, L1〉 is l-preferred to 〈A2, L2〉, noted 〈A1, L1〉 L 〈A2, L2〉 iff for every
(Ii, R) ∈ Min(〈A1, L1〉) and for every (Ij , K) ∈ Min(〈A2, L2〉) it holds that (Ii, R)>dio(Ij , K).
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Proposition 2 The relation L is a an argument comparison criterion.
Proof:We have to prove that for all A,B ∈ Args:
1. ALA does not hold (irreflexivity).
Straightforward by Definition 13 and Definition 12.
2. if AL B then BLA (asymmetry).
Suppose AL B. Then for every (Ii, R) ∈ Min(〈A1, L1〉) and for every (Ij , K) ∈ Min(〈A2, L2〉)
it holds that (Ii, R)>dio(Ij , K). Thus, there is no (Ik, Y ) ∈ Min(〈A2, L2〉) and (Ih, Z) ∈
Min(〈A1, L1〉) it holds that (Ik, Y )>dio(Ih, Z). Hence, BLA.
Example 9 Consider the agent (Ie,∆+Eve, G-setEve,) of Example 3 and its arguments presented in
Example 6. Consider now that the selected comparison criteria  is L. Observe that the argument
〈A7,∼w〉 = 〈{(Ic, ∼w —< )},∼w〉 is l-preferred to 〈A8, t〉 = 〈{(Ie, t —< ∼w), (Ic, ∼w —< )}, t〉 because
the element in Min(〈A7,∼w〉) = {(Ic, ∼w —< )} is preferred to the only element in Min(〈A8, t〉) =
{(Ie, t —< ∼w)}. Note that 〈A8, t〉 is not l-preferred to 〈A2,∼t〉 = 〈{(Ib, ∼t —< w), (Ib, w —< )},∼t〉 since
the element in Min(〈A8, t〉) is not preferred to the ones in Min(〈A2,∼t〉) = {(Ib, ∼t —< w), (Ib, w —< )}.
The last criterion we will present is the multiple rule credibility criterion, which also takes a more
careful approach than our previously introduced single credibility criterion. This criterion will prefer
an argument A over another B when every defeasible information object from A is preferred to some
defeasible information object from B, and there is no defeasible information object in B that is preferred
to one in A.
Definition 14 (Multiple rule credibility criterion) Let 〈A, L〉 and 〈B, Q〉 be two arguments of an
ibdp ∆+. We will say that 〈A, L〉 is m-preferred to 〈B, Q〉, noted 〈A, L〉 M 〈B, Q〉 iff:
• For all (Ii, U) ∈ A and there exists (Ij , V ) ∈ B such that (Ii, U)>dio(Ij , V ), and
• There is no (Ik, X) ∈ A such that there exists (Il, Y ) ∈ B such that (Il, Y )>dio(Ik, X)
Proposition 3 The relation M is a an argument comparison criterion.
Proof:We have to prove that for all A,B ∈ Args:
1. AMA does not hold (irreflexivity).
If for all (Ii, U) ∈ A1 and there is (Ij , V ) ∈ A such that (Ii, U)>dio(Ij , V ), then it does not
hold that there is no (Ik, X) ∈ A such that there is a (Il, Y ) ∈ A holding that (Il, Y )>dio(Ik, X)
which contradicts the second condition of Definition 14. Hence, AMA does not hold.
2. if AMB then BMA (asymmetry)
Suppose AMB. Then, for all (Ii, U) ∈ A1 and there is (Ij , V ) ∈ B such that (Ii, U)>dio(Ij , V ),
and there is no (Ik, X) ∈ A such that there is a (Il, Y ) ∈ B holding that (Il, Y )>dio(Ik, X).
Thus, there is no (Ih, Y ) ∈ B and there is (Ig, Z) ∈ A such that (Ih, Y )>dio(Ig, Z) violating the
first condition of the Definition 14. Hence, BMA.
Example 10 Consider the agent (Ie,∆+Eve, G-setEve,) in Example 3 and its arguments presented in
Example 6. Consider now that the selected comparison criteria  is M . Observe that the argument
〈A8, t〉 = 〈{(Ie, t —< ∼w), (Ic, ∼w —< )}, t〉 is preferred to 〈A4, r〉 = 〈{(Ip, r —< ∼p), (Ip, ∼p —< )}, r〉
under the multiple rule credibility criterion because every element in A8 is preferred to an element in A4,
and no element in A4 is preferred to one in A8.
Below, in Figure 3 we present a table showing the comparison for the arguments of Example 6 using
the three criterions based on informants credibility previously defined. In this table we compare pairs of
arguments that directly attack each other. Each row corresponds to a pair of arguments, and the columns
to the criterion used to compare them. The special symbol “≈” is used to denote that no argument in
the pair is preferred in using the criterion identified in column.
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Arguments S L M
〈A1, w〉, 〈A7,∼w〉 〈A7,∼w〉S〈A1, w〉 〈A7,∼w〉L〈A1, w〉 〈A7,∼w〉M 〈A1, w〉
〈A2,∼t〉, 〈A5, t〉 〈A2,∼t〉S〈A5, t〉 〈A2,∼t〉L〈A5, t〉 〈A2,∼t〉M 〈A5, t〉
〈A2,∼t〉, 〈A8, t〉 〈A8, t〉S〈A2,∼t〉 〈A2,∼t〉 ≈ 〈A8, t〉 〈A2,∼t〉 ≈ 〈A8, t〉
〈A3,∼r〉, 〈A4, r〉 〈A3,∼r〉S〈A4, r〉 〈A3,∼r〉L〈A4, r〉 〈A3,∼r〉M 〈A4, r〉
〈A4, r〉, 〈A9,∼r〉 〈A9,∼r〉S〈A4, r〉 〈A9,∼r〉L〈A4, r〉 〈A9,∼r〉M 〈A4, r〉
Figure 3: Table comparing agent Ie arguments using the credibility based criterions
5 Defeat and Warrant
Agents build arguments from their knowledge bases to support their beliefs; but, the possibility of conflict
among them exists bringing the focus on the notion of attack that was analyzed in Section 3. Attacks
could succeed or fail and to decide what happens a comparison criterion becomes necessary. In Section 4,
we have characterized preference criteria that can be applied to arguments built in the context of an
ibdp ∆+ to decide which one is better. We will now put these things together to introduce the inference
mechanism that will obtain the beliefs of an agent.
Informally, the notion of defeat can be considered as an attack that is effective; an attack will be
deemed effective when the argument that attacks is better than the argument that receives the attack.
The formal definition, adapted from [5], follows.
Definition 15 (Defeater) Let 〈A1, L1〉 and 〈A2, L2〉 be two arguments build from an ibdp ∆+, and let
 be an argument comparison criterion. The argument 〈A1, L1〉 is a defeater for 〈A2, L2〉 at literal L
under , if and only if there exists a subargument 〈A, L〉 of 〈A2, L2〉 such that 〈A1, L1〉 counterargues
〈A2, L2〉 at L, and 〈A, L〉 is not preferred to 〈A1, L1〉 under .
When the counterargument 〈A1, L1〉 is better than 〈A, L〉 with respect to the comparison criterion
used, then 〈A1, L1〉 will be called a proper defeater for 〈A2, L2〉. If the comparison is undecided, i.e.,
neither argument is better, nor worse, than the other, a blocking situation occurs, and we will say that
〈A1, L1〉 is a blocking defeater for 〈A2, L2〉. If 〈A2, L2〉 is better than its attacker 〈A1, L1〉, then 〈A1, L1〉
will not be considered as a defeater for 〈A2, L2〉.
Example 11 Consider the agent (Ie,∆+Eve, G-setEve,) of Example 3 and its arguments presented in
Example 6. Using the S comparison criterion, the argument 〈A8, t〉 is a defeater for 〈A2,∼t〉, since
〈A8, t〉 is a counter-argument for 〈A2,∼t〉 and as we have shown in Example 8 〈A8, t〉 S 〈A2,∼t〉.
Observe that 〈A2,∼t〉 is not a defeater for 〈A8, t〉, then 〈A8, t〉 is a proper defeater for 〈A2,∼t〉. Using
the L criterion the argument 〈A8, t〉 is a defeater for 〈A2,∼t〉, but also 〈A2,∼t〉 defeats 〈A8, t〉. That
is, under L the arguments 〈A2,∼t〉 and 〈A8, t〉 are blocking defeaters.
To determine whether a belief L can be accepted it is necessary to find out if there exists at least an
undefeated argument A that supports that belief; naturally, this will lead to analyze all possible attackers
to see if any of them can be regarded as a defeater of 〈A, L〉. In case that any defeater 〈B, Q〉 of 〈A, L〉
is found we need to repeat the process of considering the possible defeaters of 〈B, Q〉, and so on. This
dialectical analysis will create a tree structure of defeaters, called dialectical tree, where every node below
the root is a defeater of its parent, and the leaves are undefeated arguments (for full details see [5]). In
a dialectical tree every node can be marked as defeated “D” or undefeated “U”; leaves are marked “U”
and the inner nodes, including the root, are marked “D” when they have at least a children marked “U”,
or marked “U” when all their children are marked “D”.
Example 12 Consider the agent (Ie,∆+Eve, G-setEve,) of Example 3 and its arguments presented in
Example 6. In the Figure 4 we show the dialectical trees for the arguments 〈A5, t〉, 〈A8, t〉 and 〈A2,∼t〉.
In particular, in the Figure 4(a) we show the dialectical trees T1, T2 and T3 for these arguments under the
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S comparison criterion and in the Figure 4(b) the trees T4, T5 and T6 are built using the L criterion. In
both figures arguments are depicted using triangles, proper defeats using filled arrows and blocking defeats
using dashed arrows. The circles beside the defeasible rule symbol in the arguments are used to illustrate
the informant associated to the defeasible information objects for the respective argument. Also observe






























































































Figure 4: Dialectical trees for the arguments supporting “t” and “∼t” using the criterion S in (a) and
L in (b)
A marked dialectical tree represents a dialectical analysis considering every possible argument the
agent can build for and against the argument in the root of the tree. Therefore if the the root argument
is marked undefeated, it means that the conclusion of the argument is warranted and can be considered a
belief for the agent; one warranted argument is enough as the support for a particular belief. Contrariwise,
if every argument for a literal is marked as defeated in its own tree, then this literal will not be warranted,
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thus the literal cannot be a belief for the agent.
Definition 16 (Warranted literals) Let (I,∆+, G-set,) be an agent and let L be a literal, then
(I,∆+, G-set,) warrants L iff there is an argument 〈A, L〉 from ∆+ such that there is a dialectical
tree under  with 〈A, L〉 as root argument and 〈A, L〉 is marked defeated.
Example 13 Consider the agent (Ie,∆+Eve, G-setEve,) of Example 3 and the marked dialectical trees
presented in Figure 4. If  is the S criterion this agent will have “t” as warranted since, as depicted
in Figure 4(a), the argument 〈A8, t〉 is marked as “U” in its dialectical tree T2. Note that using S the
literal “∼t” is not warranted since the only argument that supports it 〈A2,∼t〉 is marked as defeated in
its own tree T3. It can be seen from T4, T5 and T6 in Figure 4(b) that using the L criterion our agent
does not warrant neither “t” nor “∼t” because all the dialectical trees have their roots marked as “D”.
6 Change operators for the dynamics of the credibility order
In the preceding sections, we have introduced a trust-based argumentation formalism where agent’s
conclusions are supported by arguments built using information from different sources. When that
information is in conflict, the credibility attached to the informants is used in the decision process leading
to a prevailing conclusion. Since in many application domains, the credibility of informant agents changes,
we will introduce the final piece in our framework to handle this common characteristic. We will introduce
change through the classic operators of expansion, contraction and revision. An agent can use these
operators for modifying its credibility order stored in its G-set; this will allow to modify the credibility of
its informants dynamically. Since the warranting process relies on the credibility of informants, a change
in its G-set can bring about changes in the set of warranted beliefs.
In [14] a form of updating the credibility order to reflect the change in the perceived agent’s credibility
was introduced. Their model formalizes change operators over that credibility order, and provides the
capability of dynamically modifying the credibility of informants to reflect a new perception of the
informant’s plausibility; also provides means for extending the set of informants by admitting the arrival
of new agents to the system. While the concept of trust is complex, in that work the authors have
taken the position that trust can be seen as a type of credibility value the agents can assign to each
other, position we will adhere here. In Section 2 we have already introduced the notion of Generator Set
following [14], and now we will adapt the change operators proposed in that work to our framework. We
will formalize the expansion and contraction operators for the credibility order of an agent and, using the
Levi identity [6, 1], we will define the revision operator out of the contraction and expansion operators
already defined.
6.1 Expansion operator for credibility orders
Here we will introduce an expansion operator for credibility partial orders called C-expansion, denoted
⊕C , and adapted to the agent structure given in Definition 4. A C-expansion consists simply in the
addition of a new credibility tuple to a generator set. Given an ordered pair of informants (I1, I2) and
a generator set G-set, this operator returns a new generator set G-set′ in which said agents are now
related, i.e., (I1, I2) ∈ G-set′ . According to this new generator set we may say that the first informant
is “less credible” than the second. The construction of expansions on credibility partial order is formally
defined as follows.
Definition 17 (C-expansion) Let I1, I2, I3 ∈ I be three agent identifiers and let (I1,∆+1, G-set1,)
an agent. The operator “⊕C”, called C-expansion is defined as follow:
(I1,∆+1, G-set1,)⊕C(I2,I3) = (I1,∆+1, G-set1 ∪ {(I2,I3)},)
Expansion does not preserve soundness in the generator set per se, but is conditioned. That is, if
G-set is a sound generator set and (I1, I2) /∈ G-set∗ then G-set ∪ {(I2,I1)} is a sound generator set.
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Example 14 Consider agent Ie of Example 3 where G-setEve = {(Ip,Ib), (Ip,Ie), (Ib, Ic), (Ie,Ic)} (see
Figure 2), then, (Ie,∆+Eve, G-setEve,)⊕C(Ie,Ib) = (Ie,∆+Eve, G-setEve ∪ {(Ie,Ib)},). In the pre-
vious expansion, Ie and Ib that were not related, are now related in the resulting set. However, an
expansion can introduce information that was implicit in the set. For instance, consider the following ex-
pansion: (Ie,∆+Eve, G-setEve,)⊕C(Ip,Ic) = (Ie,∆+Eve, G-setEve∪{(Ip,Ic)},) here the tuple (Ip,Ic)
is added to the G−set but the two agents were already related because (Ip,Ic) ∈ G-set∗Eve.
6.2 Contraction operator for credibility orders
We will define a contraction operator for credibility partial order among agents, called C-contraction, that
will be denoted “	C”, and will be adapted to the agent structure introduced in Definition 4. Consider
the informants I1, I2 and I3. Suppose that, (I1,∆+1, G-set1,) is an agent such that (I2, I3) ∈ G-set∗1;
the basic task of the 	C operator is to construct a new generator set G-set′1 in which (I2, I3) 6∈ G-set′1∗,
losing as less information as possible. As we will show below, contraction does not mean simply to remove
those credibility tuples containing (I2, I3) from G-set1. Every path from I2 to I3 has to be considered.
Hence, the notions of non-redundant path and paths set are introduced.
Definition 18 (Non-redundant Path [14]) Let I1, I2, I3, I4 ∈ I, let (I1,∆+1, G-set1,) be an agent
and P ⊆ G-set1. We say that the set of credibility tuples P is a path from I2 to I4 in G-set1, if (I2,I4) ∈ P,
or (I2,I3) ∈ P and there is a path from I3 to I4 in P. We say that P is a non-redundant path from I2
to I4 if there is no other path P′ from I2 to I4 in G-set1, such that P′ ( P.
Definition 19 (Paths set [14]) Let I1, I2, I2 ∈ I and let (I1,∆+1, G-set1,) be an agent, we define
the paths set from I2 to I3 in G-set1, denoted G-set
(I2-I3)
1 , as G-set
(I2-I3)
1 = {P : P is a non-redundant
path from I1 to I2 in G-set1}.
Example 15 Consider agent Ie of Example 3 where G-setEve = {(Ip,Ib), (Ip,Ie), (Ib, Ic), (Ie,Ic)} (see
Figure 2). Then, the paths set from Ip to Ic in G-setEve is G-set
(Ip-Ic)
Eve = {P1,P2}, where:
P1 = { (Ip,Ie), (Ie,Ic)}
P2 = { (Ip,Ib), (Ib,Ic)}
Remark 2 Given G-set ⊆ I× I, since G-set∗ is defined over the transitive closure of the credibility order
among informants, then, (I1,I2) ∈ G-set∗ if and only if there exists at least one element in G-set(I1-I2).
It is clear from Remark 2 that given a generator set G-set ⊆ I × I, for the contraction of G-set by
(I1, I2) we need to eliminate at least one credibility tuple in every path of G-set(I1-I2). In other words,
we need to eliminate a set of credibility tuples from G-set so that no path is left from I1 to I2 in G-set.
In our approach this set to be eliminated will be required to be minimal. In [14], the contraction of a
generator set by a credibility tuple (I1, I2) uses a cut mechanism to decide which tuples are erased from
each path from I1 to I2. Next, we give the definition of cut function defined there.
Definition 20 (Cut function) Given a paths set G-set(I1-I2), we say that σ is a cut function for




2. For each path P ∈ G-set(I1-I2), P ∩ σ(G-set(I1-I2)) 6= ∅.
Example 16 Consider again agent Ie of Example 3 and the paths set G-set
(Ip-Ic)
Eve = {P1,P2} obtained in
Example 15, where P1 = {(Ip,Ie), (Ie,Ic)} and P2 = {(Ip,Ib), (Ib,Ic)}. To obtain the set σ(G-set
(Ip-Ic)
Eve ),
at least one element of each path has to be selected. Then, to avoid the occurrence of (Ip,Ic), the cut
function selects the tuples that will be erased from each path. Note that in each path the cut function can
select two tuples or either one of these, depending on its specification. Suppose that (Ip,Ie) is selected by
the cut function from P1 and (Ib,Ic) is selected from P2. Therefore, σ(G-set
(Ip-Ic)
Eve ) = {(Ip,Ie), (Ib,Ic)}.
Next, a C-contraction operator will be defined.
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Definition 21 (C-contraction) Let I1, I2, I3 ∈ I be three agent identifiers, (I2,I3) a credibility tuple,
(I1,∆+1, G-set1,) an agent, G-set(I2-I3)1 a paths set, and let σ be a cut function for G-set
(I2-I3)
1 . The
operator “	C”, called C-contraction, is defined as follows:
(I1,∆+1, G-set1,)	C(I2,I3) = (I1,∆+1, G-set1 \ σ↓(G-set(I2-I3)1 ),)
It is important to note that we have defined a family of contraction operators following other estab-
lished formalisms of belief revision [1, 7]. The specification of the cut function will allow the introduction
of different possibilities.
Example 17 Consider agent Ie of Example 3 where G-setEve = {(Ip,Ib), (Ip,Ie), (Ib, Ic), (Ie,Ic)}.
Then, suppose Eve (Ie) wants to reflect that the client assigned (Ic) to her is no longer more credible
than her colleague Paul (Ip). That is, Ie wants to contract by the credibility tuple (Ip, Ic) using “	C”. As
shown in Example 16, σ(G-set(Ip-Ic)Eve ) = {(Ip,Ie), (Ib,Ic)}. Hence, (Ie,∆
+
Eve, G-setEve,)	C(Ip,Ic) =
(Ie,∆+Eve, G-setEve \ σ↓(G-set
(Ip-Ic)
Eve ),) = (Ie,∆
+
Eve, {(Ip,Ib), (Ie,Ic)},). Figure 5 shows (left) the
graph for the original generator set G-setEve and (right) the graph for the resulting generator set after















Figure 5: Ie contracted by (Ip, Ic).
Notice that here, in contrast to the case of expansion, the soundness preservation property of con-
traction is not conditioned. This is due to the way we define contraction. Since contraction is basically
a process of elimination, it is impossible for this operation to introduce cycles if there were none with
which to begin.
6.3 Prioritized revision operator for credibility orders
In this section, we will define a prioritized revision operator for credibility partial order among agents,
called C-revision, denoted “~C”, and adapted to the agent structure introduced in Definition 4. When an
agent (I1,∆+1, G-set1,) receives a new credibility tuple, the operator ~C will modify G-set1 and will
guarantee: soundness preservation and that the new information prevails. Consider agent I1 receives the
information that I2 is less credible than I3. Since the new information has priority, the basic task of the
C-revision operator is to construct a new generator set in which (I2, I3) ∈ G-set∗1 but (I3, I2) 6∈ G-set∗1.
When an agent (I1,∆+1, G-set1,) is revised by a credibility tuple (I2, I3) there exist two tasks:
1. to maintain the soundness of G-set1: if (I3, I2) ∈ G-set∗1 (i.e., (I2, I3) generates a cycle in G-set1),
then is necessary to erase some credibility tuples from G-set1 to avoid cycles.
2. to add (I2, I3) to G-set1: this is the most simple task to characterize from the logical point of view
because it consists only in the addition of a new credibility tuple.
The first task can be accomplished contracting by (I3, I2). The second task can be accomplished
expanding by (I2, I3). This composition is based on the Levi identity [6, 1], which proposes that a
revision can be constructed out of two operations: a contraction and an expansion.
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Definition 22 (Prioritized C-revision) Let I1, I2, I3 ∈ I be three agent identifiers, (I2,I3) a credibil-
ity tuple, (I1,∆+1, G-set1,) an agent, 	C the C-contraction operator and ⊕C the C-expansion operator.
The operator “ ~C”, called prioritized C-revision, is defined as follows:
(I1,∆+1, G-set1,)~C(I2,I3) = ((I1,∆+1, G-set1,)	C(I3,I2))⊕C(I2,I3)
Example 18 Consider aging the agent Eve Ie. Then, suppose Ie wants to reflect that her boss (Ib) is
more credible than the client assigned (Ic) to her. That is, Ie wants to revise by (Ic, Ib) using “~C”.
Since (Ib,Ic) ∈ G-setEve then it is first necessary to contract (Ie,∆+Eve, G-setEve,) by (Ib,Ic) and
then it is necessary to expand by (Ic, Ib). Figure 6 shows (left) the graph for the original generator set
G-setEve and (right) the graph for the resulting generator set after the revision by (Ic, Ib) where one arc










Eve Ie (Ic, Ib)
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Figure 6: Ie revised by (Ic, Ib).
Note that here, when the the credibility order considered by Eve is changed, the preferences among its
argument also changes. In the following table we depict the preferences among the arguments of Eve in
this new situation considering the comparison criteria which were presented in Section 4.
Arguments S L M
〈A1, w〉, 〈A7,∼w〉 〈A1, w〉S〈A7,∼w〉 〈A1, w〉L〈A7,∼w〉 〈A1, w〉L〈A7,∼w〉
〈A2,∼t〉, 〈A5, t〉 〈A2,∼t〉S〈A5, t〉 〈A2,∼t〉L〈A5, t〉 〈A2,∼t〉M 〈A5, t〉
〈A2,∼t〉, 〈A8, t〉 〈A8, t〉S〈A2,∼t〉 〈A2,∼t〉L〈A8, t〉 〈A2,∼t〉M 〈A8, t〉
〈A3,∼r〉, 〈A4, r〉 〈A3,∼r〉S〈A4, r〉 〈A3,∼r〉L〈A4, r〉 〈A3,∼r〉M 〈A4, r〉
〈A4, r〉, 〈A9,∼r〉 〈A9,∼r〉S〈A4, r〉 〈A9,∼r〉L〈A4, r〉 〈A9,∼r〉M 〈A4, r〉
Also observe that this change will affect Eve’s warranted literals. In this scenario Ie will have “∼t” as
warranted under the three possible criterions whereas in Example 13 we have shown that under S Ie
had “t” warranted and neither “t” nor “∼t” under the other two criterions.
7 Conclusions and related work
We have defined an argumentative reasoning formalism where the notion of trust plays a central role.
Each individual agent considers tentative conclusions obtained from its knowledge base by building argu-
ments; often, arguments have contradictory conclusions and/or contradictory elements in their structure.
Arguments conflicting with the support for tentative conclusions act as counterarguments and the need
for an argument comparison criterion becomes clear in this context. In the formalism, every source of
information is attributed certain credibility leading to a perception of trustworthiness. Trust in turn
leads to a preference criterion over the set of arguments helping to decide which conclusions deserve to be
warranted. Thus, the inference mechanism compares arguments and counter-arguments in the course to
decide which argument should prevail. An agent (I,∆+, G-set,) can use its own information and also
the information previously received stored in ∆+ to warrant its derived beliefs; a belief B is warranted if
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there exists a non-defeated argument for B. The trust-based argument comparison criterion  was used
for deciding when an argument defeats another; hence, warranted beliefs depend on the credibility order
G-set. We have also introduced different argument comparison criteria based on trust that could be used
accordingly with the representational needs of different domains.
Finally, the trust assigned to informants is inherently changeable and most realistic scenarios should
consider this possibility; for that reason, we have introduced the change operators for expansion, contrac-
tion and revision following the tradition in Belief Change Theory. An agent I can use these operators to
act on the credibility relation established on the set agent G-set; this brings the ability of dynamically
changing the credibility assigned to its informants. Therefore, as the warranting process relies on the
credibility of informants, a change in G-set opens the possibility that previously warranted beliefs become
unsupported, and that new beliefs turn into accepted conclusions.
Recently, some approaches combining argumentation and trust have been developed [11, 16, 15, 8]; in
general, these formalisms are focused on using argumentation to reason about trust. Here we have follow
a different route that in a sense is complementary, our proposal uses the trust relation defined in the set of
informants as part of the decision process which leads to obtain the prevailing information in the context
of conflictive knowledge. In [8] an argumentative formalism for reasoning about the appropriateness of
an argument’s proponent is given; that is, the paper explores how arguments can be evaluated in terms
of the proponents trustiness in relation to that particular argument. Hunter’s work is related to our
approach in that he also attributes importance to the source of the information; however, in contrast
with ours, his proposal includes augmenting the representation and reasoning infrastructure with a meta-
level system for reasoning about the object-level arguments and their proponents. The meta-level system
incorporates axioms for raising the object-level argumentation to the meta-level (in particular to capture
when one argument is a counterargument to another argument), and meta-level axioms that specify when
proponents are appropriate for arguments.
Our work is also related with [5]. Similar to that work we use defeasible rules and presumptions
for knowledge representation, and we use DeLP marked dialectical trees for computing warranted belief.
However, in contrast to that approach, we propose some new argument comparison criteria that differ
from those reported in the DeLP literature. Here, we define three new trust-based argument comparison
criteria and we compare them. Thus, the more appropriate criterion to the application domain can be
selected.
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